Entitlements, Identity and Time: 
Addressing Aboriginal Rights and Nature Protection 
in Siberia’s New Resource Colonies

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Preface

The first Easter Sunday of the new millennium brought to a close a remarkable week of events in the history of post-Soviet Siberia. On April 12, 2001, the third natural resource ‘oligarch’ Zolotarev breezed easily into office as Governor of the Evenki Autonomous District, bringing with him a parliament composed of oil men and Moscow-based financiers. The landslide election of Zolotarev, along with that of Governors Khloponin in Taimyr and Abramovich in Chukotka, completed a political trinity of magnates wherein the voice of the Siberian people became the voice of oil, precious metals, and finance capital. The next day, April 13, over two hundred regional delegates of the Association of Native Sparse Peoples of the North, Siberia, and the Far East gathered in the House of People’s Deputies (formerly the Congress hall of the Central Executive Committee of the CPSU) to hold their fourth congress, and to look back upon their first four years as an association of native peoples. At the last congress, in 1997, the delegates took the controversial stand of adding the word ‘native’ (korennoi) to the title of an association which for a decade previously had highlighted only their diminutive demography and remote geography. Then the delegates added what may at first glance seem to be a simple word in order to draw much-needed attention to their privileged claim to land and to protection of what are called traditional ‘ways of land-use’. At this recent congress, sobered by the results of the regional elections, the main topic of discussion at the presidium as in the corridors was ‘where’ people could talk about aboriginal rights since it now seemed that their parliaments and autonomous districts were also being taken away from them. Obviously, there was no easy answer to this question. As discussion became heated over the contested re-election of Kharuchi as their federal leader, the day grew to a close giving birth to a remarkable
celestial and ritual event. For the first time in many years the motion of the moon and the complex mathematics of Eastern and Western ritual specialists coincided with the common conclusion that the Holy Resurrection occurred on the same morn. As bells rang-out at midnight in Moscow at the bounds between April 14 and April 15, the streets filled with candle-bearing witnesses circling their churches. In the newspapers the next day and on live television coverage, political and economic commentators spoke alike of a happy temporal alignment of faith between East and West and spoke of the prospect of increased dialogue and understanding. At the end of this remarkable week, as at the end of ten years of unsteady ‘reform’, the stark and stable Russia of high socialism seemed to be miraculously reborn in the body of finance and resource-based capital.

Introduction

Central Siberia is a wealthy, sparsely populated region straddling the Yenisei River. It is the home to many aboriginal peoples (most significantly Evenkis, Dolgans, and various nations of the Samoed language family) as well as to some of the larger urbanised concentrations of Russian industry commencing with the SAZ aluminium factory at the source of the Yenisei in Khakassia and concluding with the Noril’sk nickel and platinoid smelter at the river’s mouth. Like most resource frontiers, be they in Australia or in the circumpolar Arctic, people and policy makers are faced with a difficult compromise between exploiting ‘strategic’ resources for the ‘fatherland’ and refraining from or redesigning production in order to respect the integrity of lands which are the homeland of very sparsely populated rural peoples, many of whom still maintain complex ritual and economic relationships with wild animals. In general, the tendency world-wide is to give pre-eminence to the priorities of strip mines and pipelines, to recognise in second place the ecological rights of wild places, and to consider the rights of rural minorities last. Both Russia and to a lesser degree the Soviet Union are no exceptions. However shifts in the style of First World capital accumulation towards ‘sustainable’ exploitation (Escobar 1996; Anderson and Berglund 2002), new norms in the relationship between industry and aboriginal peoples (Goloveny and Osherenko 1999; Trigger 1999), and, to a lesser degree, the development of less-intensive technologies of mining have created a small
legal and economic space where local rural interests can be accommodated if not respected. An interesting question to pose is to what degree new Russian capitalism, which has proven itself so-open to learning the techniques of controlling share packets and hostile take-overs, is also generous to models of situating capital accumulation within wider circuits of social responsibility. However, a more interesting question, which will serve as the theme for this paper, is the way that old socialist forms of co-ordinating industrial development with centrally-interpreted needs have so easily been resurrected in the new highly concentrated arenas of money and power. The paper will examine the ways that rural peoples in central Siberia are now reorganising to protect their claims to land and resources. To this end, I will examine the new fields of nature protection and of aboriginal rights, both of which have the potential to fragment a legal landscape which today seems entirely open to industrial development. I will argue that these both ideas are Western exotic imports to Siberia. I will concede that they are nevertheless appropriate given the stranglehold that the new oligarchs have on all forms of social power. Both the new model of oligarchic power and the radical idea of 'aboriginal' access to wild spaces will be reconciled by considering how claims are made to the past and the future. In the new Siberia of oligarchs and aboriginal people, ownership claims to an unambiguous past and future are the most powerful and profitable property claims that can be made.

An Overview of Land and Resource Rights in Siberia

The study of rights to land and the ideology of property in general are a particularly rich endeavour in Arctic Siberia. Although this region differs markedly historically and ecologically from the central agricultural regions of Russia – arguably the birthplace of both unsightly sibling programmes of collectivisation and privatisation – it nonetheless is a very clear location to explore the contradictions of post-socialist development. Whether one accepts Lenin's mystical dictum that the contradictions of imperialism are clearer at its edges, or the geo-political analysis of the overwhelming power of metropole relationships over areas considered to be 'peripheral', Siberia has always been a place where the fantasies of urban reformers have always been played out to wonton excess.

One quality of this place, which is different than agricultural-dominated regions to the South, is the difficulty with which the landscape can be
parcelled. Lands which have the most meaning for local people are usually unbroken or only formally broken expanses of tundra or forest, nominally the property of ‘the State’, but under the de facto control of common law traditions or various legal or illegal elaborations on state licensing laws. A second quality which overdetermines the relationship between people, and between people and land, tends to be the fact that local people are a demographic majority only over vast, scarcely populated rural areas but are a factual minority when their rural landscape is forcibly united with one or more urban areas. Thus there is generally a mismatch of criteria, which make it difficult to gauge the popular will. On the one hand, when urban miners vote overwhelming for one of their own there is a clear democratic mandate of executive organs over voters. On the other hand, I can imagine no more potent image of fundamental injustice as the wealth and arrogance of an urban centre, which casually passes sentence over the ecological health, and lives of people in a rural periphery. In Siberia, as in resource peripheries world-wide, there is a usually a crisis in what Charles Taylor (1992; 1998) calls ‘the politics of recognition’ — literally a way of representing fundamental cultural and ecological identities in a field dominated by liberal democratic rules of representation. This ‘crisis’ generally attracts the attention of non-governmental organisations who have been extremely successful at labelling, packaging, and promoting different types of evocative parcels such as parks or reserves. These NGOs exercise a large degree of influence over how the state and aboriginal people re-imagine their past and assert their future. Finally, due to the extreme value to the world economy of the resources extracted in these places — diamonds, gold, oil, and in some cases, timber — the political context tends to push for the speedy and ostentatious resolution of any claims or road-blocks to extraction. Thus political settlements are either bloody and brutal, or as is more recently the case, potentially generous but somewhat impatient with long-winded explorations of the quality of rights.

Central Siberia is somewhat special ethnographically for the richness of the way in which local people attend to land. With some regret I will not elaborate on this here, although the wisdom of many hunters and herders on this subject never ceases to amaze me. In short, if in anthropology it has become a standard tenant to only speak of property as a set of relations between people (and not that of between people and things), in Evenki and Dolgan places one still hears the strong conviction that land itself is alive and
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moves and reacts much like a person. Thus in this setting one must strive to understand the politics and intentions of human persons, often animal persons such as migratory caribou or domestic reindeer, but also the living and attentive world that surrounds. While very prosaic, and somewhat abstract to urban sensibilities, I find the conviction with which rural hunters speak of the land to be no less opaque than the way that governments speak of their nations having ‘wills’, ‘destinies’, and ‘interests’, not to mention the powerful kinship idioms often used in Russia to describe the state. Here, the central issue is not so much one of calculating the trajectory of interests of a variety of class fractions, but of finding a way of accommodating local human livelihoods with larger sentient entities be they an omniscient personified nation or a judicious personified landscape.

Post-Soviet Russia still supports two unique institutional legacies, which are notable, both for their prominent (and unsung) positions in the history of political philosophy and for the clumsiness with which they fit World Bank models of market development. One unique legacy is the history of calculating social entitlements through nationally stratified territorial enclaves (be they autonomous national districts or nationally stratified rural institutions like collective farms) which are one of the more unique and flexible models of recognising rural interests in the North. The other legacy is a pioneering history in setting aside a broad range of protected areas (zapovedniki, national parks, zakazniki) in which ‘nature’ is protected but also within which certain types of scholarly and economic activity has been protected and encouraged. From the little that I have learned of the history of both legacies from historians of Siberia like Sergei Bakhrushkin (1955) and Yuri Slezkine (1994), as from the environmental historian Douglas Weiner (1988; 1999), many of the late 19th Century and early 20th Century figures who campaigned for each type of political-ecological institutions were one and the same people. Given the cultural depth of these two unique institutions, perhaps it is not an accident that they are both so much at the forefront of political discussion today along with news of corporate concentrations of wealth and power and the painful discussion of nationality issues. With the resurrection of corporate command economies in three formerly autonomous national districts this Easter, one can argue that Russia has crossed an important threshold. It would seem the battle against all forms of collective entitlement is now over. With the coming of the oligarchs there
is little question of reviving some sort of locally evocative system of social entitlement. Instead, aboriginal people are now challenged to modify the oligarchic control of economic power, legislative power, and regional executive power. In using the idioms of nature protection and aboriginal rights, and perhaps some older ideas of central control over entitlements, rural activists hope to breathe new life into old forms of autonomy for nationalities and for ecosystems.

Oligarchic 'Holdings' and the Demise of National Autonomy

As the Russian press followed the recent slate of regional elections in Siberia from December 2000 through to April 2001, the word 'oligarch' became a key term in the analysis of Russian power. If in the not-so-distant past, parallels were drawn between the gangster capitalism of the 'wild west', or Lenin's observations on the 'primitive accumulation of capital', most commentary waxed with some excitement over the coming of new figures to power – young, rich, educated, elite figures who had a direct interest in not only restructuring the accumulation of wealth for their shareholders but also had an applied interest in changing the shape of the state itself. In the three cases of Chukotka, Taimyr, and Evenkiia it was said that the Kremlin itself endorsed the assent of these oligarchs to power. In all three regions the technology of translating power to votes was not difficult. Cynics said that in these sparsely populated districts it was most 'cost-effective' to buy votes. More subtle analyses focussed on the expense invested in advertisements, door-to-door canvassing and monitoring of electoral turn-out, as well as extremely viscous attacks on the integrity of older figures who held power. As much as the so-called 'dirty' politics caught the anger of those who had been missing their wages for years on end, not to mention those who spent a harsh winter in Evenkiia without heat or electricity, many voters were attracted to the admittedly desperate promise that these young rich men could attract more attention and more resources to the crumbling state of life in these predominantly Arctic districts. Although for the most part aboriginal voters campaigned for older, tested faces, it was not rare for Evenki and Dolgan voters to argue that a larger financial pie would necessarily imply that more crumbs would find their way to tables in rural villages.

The baptism of these new leaders as oligarchs is not at all exaggerated. It may be possible for historians to find some similar examples of the concen-
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...tration of political power in the hands of corporate executives in Western Europe, North America, or most likely Latin America. However, to take the region with which I am most familiar, the Taimyr, the collapse of all levels of power is so clean and so seamless that where one once could identify a 'city-state' (Anderson 1996b; Grant 2001, 338) now one can identify an entire corporate regional power block. Observers of the transition constantly find the fusion of the political and economic spheres so total that the best comparison is a form of feudalism (Kagarlitsky 1990, 254; Skhlapentokh 1996; Verdery 1996).

At first glance, the recent reconfiguration of affairs in Taimyr justifies all forms of hyperbole. In the recent (January 2001) elections for the Taimyr Duma, the victors, without exception, were the candidates put forward by the Noril’sk mining and smelting monopoly and its twin monopoly Noril’sk Gasprom. The successful gubernatorial candidate, Aleksandr Khloponin, was until his inauguration the General Director of Noril’sk Alpine Metal kombinat, a wholly owned subsidiary of Noril’sk Nickel, a 'holding company' which in addition to holding mines all across the Russian North in turn is held by one of Russia’s most powerful banks – Rosbank. He was swept into power with a slate of deputies representing all urban and rural districts of Taimyr, none of whom is an aboriginal person (for the first time in the history of Taimyr).² Kholopinin’s successful electoral campaign followed only a few months after the re-registration of the corporate bank-accounts of Noril’sk Nickel in the City of Dudinka (Taimyr) rather than in its homeland in the City of Noril’sk (Krasnoiarsk Territory). Following the election, the only difference between executive power vested in the governor’s seat and legislative power in the seats of the Duma seems to have become be a difference between nickel and gas. The blurring of spheres power continued rapidly following the election. In the shuffle of Assistant Governors (zamestitel’nie gubernatory) and Ministers (nachalniki) within the administration of Taimyr, Khlopinin’s first change was to ‘break’ (in his words) a fifty-year-old Soviet tradition wherein the First Assistant Governor was both a native person and the Minister in charge of Rural Economy (sel’sko-khoziaistvo). Instead, he nominated a nickel man as his first assistant and dissolved the entire Ministry of Rural Economy putting its fragments within a new super-ministry of Infrastructure and Rural Development.³ In a more radical move, all aboriginal people who worked within various departments of the Taimyr civil service were forcibly
resettled into a single ministry of Nationality Policy and Interregional Relations where all ministers (save the Assistant Governor herself) are Noril’sk metallurgists. With these radical changes governor Khloponin not only merged legislative with executive power but also blurred the face of public administration with that of corporate governance. The changes are most tangible, for anthropologists at least, when the significant public holidays in Taimyr become ‘Day of the Metallurgist’ (instead of the Day of the Reindeer Herder) and public officials pass out calling cards with the address of Noril’sk Nickel instead of the Administration of Taimyr.

Whether or not the new form of oligarchy with its characteristic fusion of legislative, executive, and corporate power is a return to feudalism or a Spartan polis, is probably merely a matter of taste for a choice of extreme terminology. It should be noted that the new oligarchs do not use indentured forms of labour. Nor is there any need for them to do so. Quite to the contrary most citizens and pensioners of the new ‘holdings’ are more worried about losing their jobs and benefits under their new managers than about defending their freedom to take their labour-power elsewhere. The pattern of power, on the other hand, is much more simply described as a form of vertical integration where competing units become subsidiaries of larger ‘controlling packets’ and what used to be organic units of workers – kollektivy – are ‘held’ by a more powerful master. The idiom of ‘holding power’ is a significant departure of older Soviet idioms where people were ‘built’ into jobs and ‘surrendered’ finished products using an idiom of reciprocity wherein one could expect paternal return attention to basic needs of food, housing, and employment. Through the simple means of projecting oneself convincing as an economic and political monopolist with a firm grip, the new oligarchs broadcast a not-so-subtle message that they have grasped a hold on the future of the electorate in this single-industry space. The new hegemony of ‘corporatism-in-one-region’ is thus easy to achieve without a monopoly on the threat of violence (Tilly 1990).

The geopolitics of Noril’sk’s interest in controlling Taimyr is a little Byzantine but adds to the picture of oligarchic control. The Noril’sk factory was for seventy years legally and physically confined to an extraterritorial postage-stamp district created by Moscow for the concentrated and exclusive development of the strategic metals found below its multi-storey high-rise buildings. The rumours are that the ores upon which the factory depends
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are near exhaustion, leading the factory to covet ore-bearing lands within
the Taimyr Autonomous District which encompasses the Noril’sk Unified
Regional Municipality. The exploitation of gold and platinum bearing
lands is regulated usually by tender through the Governor of the district.
With this election, the (former) General Director of the factory, and no-
doubt one of the larger shareholders can now dictate the conditions of the
tender. The Governor, in one of his first acts of office, actually unilaterally
cancelled a tender issued by the former Governor to Slavneft (which in turn
was acting for Shell Petroleum) to the oil and gas fields on the extreme south-
western corner of Taimyr and reissued the licenses to Noril’sk Gasprom.

The face of power in this new administration, as in Chukotka and Evenkiia,
is also different. Aleksandr Khloponin is in his early 30’s. He grew up in
a new-Russian enclave Cyprus and speaks surprising good English. In inter-
views, he is charming, witty, and speaks with a lot of pride in his vision for
a cost-effective and business-like Taimyr. Even with these qualities alone he
projects a more effusive image of power than the stern pillar of authority
performed by Soviet-era mandarins. While chain-smoking next to his com-
puter, he enjoys using the rhetoric of reform. He speaks of creating a new
Siberia where native people would be entrepreneurs who earn money for
work invested and not for the fact that they are deserving ‘ethnics with
their hands held out’. He also enjoys of speaking of a new Krasnoiarsk
Territory where historical ‘mistakes’ such as the jurisdictional disjuncture
between Taimyr and the mineral colony of Noril’sk are rectified to make one
‘common, whole Taimyr’. It is rumoured that he has his eye on the gover-
norship of Krasnoiarsk Territory. As colourful his vision may be it is very
rhetorical. The word ‘breaking the old system’ (lomat) peppers his phrases.
However when listening to concrete examples of his vision he often mixes-up
the names of Taimyr’s nationalities and makes small errors in demographic
statistics of a magnitude of several tens of thousands. Indeed he not only has
not lived in Taimyr nor for that matter spent much time in the former Soviet
Union. His background is in the homeless world of finance. He moves com-
fortably in circles from London, Amsterdam to Moscow. It would seem that
he is still not too comfortable in Taimyr since he, his Assistant Governors,
their assistants, and even their secretaries work by shift-method. They live
in Moscow and shuttle to Dudinka ‘ten-days-on and ten-days-off’ to rule
the resource colony. Thus while the fact of executive, legislative, and financial
power concentrated in the hands of a very small and elite organisation recalls the days of Brezhnev, the style of power has a mercantile quality which gives neo-colonialism a new name. It is said that the administration of Sibneft-supported Abramovich, and the now-forming administration of Yukos-sponsored governor of Evenkiia, have adopted a similar pattern of power.

Despite the wholesale transformation of the structure of power and the former Soviet system of nationality-stratified entitlement, it must be conceded that the new oligarchs do have a social programme. One of the asset-unproven ironies of this shift in power has been the overt ‘business-like’ conviction of the new administrations in Chukotka, Evenkiia and in Taimyr to sign-off a new deal with rural native peoples. After four years of unsuccessful attempts to table laws concerning territories of traditional land-use and on the status of native peoples, both the Federal and the Taimyr regional associations of sparse native peoples of the North are now having to cool the enthusiasm of the new oligarchs for quickly passing hastily drafted laws. In Taimyr, after a period of uncertainty following the inauguration of the new governor, there is tangible evidence for strategic purchases of meat and fish with the aim of supporting the local, native economy. The speaker of the Taimyr Duma and the Governor speak in unison of generously funded programmes to rebuild native villages using in some cases imported wind-power technology or pre-fabricated houses from Scandinavia or Canada. One of the first acts of the newly elected Gasprom Duma was to devote a line item to support the activities of the Taimyr Association of Sparse Native Peoples for the first time since its foundation ten years ago. All of these programmes are flashy, expensive, and not terribly well thought out. However they do stand out after almost fifteen years of stagnation and even starvation within rural villages at the end of the Soviet period and the beginning of the period of reform.

The agenda of the new administrations is, of course, obvious. In terms of the immense benefit of achieving legitimate and unrestricted access to new sources of natural resources it is considered to be a very small cost to pay a small fraction of the development costs of these billion dollar lodes to the few thousand native peoples scattered through-out the region. The new Taimyr governor in his campaign speeches praised international models of mineral development in Canada and the United States wherein large corporations co-develop resources with local peoples. To some degree, this new
oligarchy is self-conscious of a certain international business sense, which is regulated by the World Bank, that recognises that local aboriginal ‘stake-holders’ must have some claim to large-scale mineral development.5

As much as this enlightened capitalist outlook might be cynical and serving short-term interests, it also has a familiar ring when put into the context of the history of these regions. Siberia’s national [autonomous] districts were formed in the early 1930s not so much to give an autochthonous voice to indigenous peoples but to provide a territory – or target area – on which the Soviet state could concentrate cadres and resources for the development of primitive northern peoples. The Russian term for district – okrug – is a telling one since it is a term that was traditionally used to denote zones formed by the military to facilitate patrolling the perimeter for foreign elements. In this idiom, the task set before the autonomous districts was for a concentrated and deliberate attempt to refashion land and people into Soviet-hyphen-Evenki or Soviet-Chukot territories. Each autonomous district had its romantic phase populated with the stories of nomadic ‘red-tent’ literacy brigades and the building of the first medical stations and rural economic institutions. In the 1970s they also had a cynical phase where they become the places where assimilative pressure against native tradition was the greatest. Nevertheless even at the height of state socialism, the autonomous districts always had a native face. There were native cadres in the Party hierarchy as in their legislative organs as well as special sections and departments which worked with native languages, native economic forms, as well as promoted folkloric dance and culture. The marriage between Soviet industrial development and a token nod towards local culture is arguably not that different than the enlightened capitalism now being articulated by the new oligarchs. It might be fair to say that we are witnessing not so much an importation of international norms into Russian resource development but a happy coincidence of two traditions of paternalistic industrial development.

It is too early to say how the rhetoric of these new administrations will turn into action. It is a foregone conclusion that Noril’sk Nickel, Yukos, and Sibneft will all get the licences and concession that they need. In the first eight months of their administrations, as noted above, there has been a disturbing tendency to remove native civil servants from the face of the administration. Will these kopeek-conscious administrations eliminate departments devoted to native education or native economic institutions? In doing so they might
also be taking a page from Canada, Alaska and Scandinavia by citing that it is far more cost-effective to hire haphazard consultants to design books or set policy than to maintain their own cadres. More disturbing are scattered hear-say comments in Dudinka which make fun of the national intellegetnsia as being those who only support their own relatives, for whom alcoholism is in the blood, or who are unqualified for their jobs. In my interviews with a small sample of administrators in the burgeoning bureaucracy of Dudinka (the number civil servants doubled under Khloponin) the most commonly heard phrase is that Russians are ‘natives’ too and have an equal right to enjoy Russian lands. These statements sadly no longer seem shocking due to a growing nationalist tone in the Russian media and in public discourse under Putin. It is too early to condemn the somewhat shallow attempts of the new oligarchs to treat native issues as way of legitimating what amounts to a rape of the landscape. Russian industrialists arguably have several generations more experience on how to balance social pressures than BP or Shell. At the present time there is optimism that the new industrialists will support free-enterprise models of native autonomy such as the farms and ‘communes’ (obshchiny) or may even support decade old attempts to zone certain parcels as places reserved for traditional forms of nature-use.

The change in power is best symbolised by two distinctive speeches by aboriginal delegates at the Fourth Congress of Sparse Native Peoples of the North, Siberia, and the Far East. In an emotional speech, a representative of ‘the most sparse people in Siberia’ on the border between Chukotka and Kamchatka (representing a nation of 6 individuals) spoke with great feeling of the collapse of rights and attention for his people. Rather than making an abstract argument about the state of aboriginal rights or aboriginal tenure he spoke of living in a decaying settlement with heat, light, or transport. The transmitter of central television and radio had long since been switched off. In his words, he ‘lived like on the tundra without having his reindeer or tasting fresh meat’. As is often the case in petitions from Siberian aboriginal people, political rights blurs quickly and easily into a litany of examples of economic underprivilege. The conclusion of his presentation came as a surprise though. He gave his heartfelt thanks to the new governor-oligarch Abramovich who both paid for his trip to Moscow to present his story but who also made the first capital investment in his village allowing his family to hunt for themselves once again. His speech is one of the clearest that I
have heard which still sees virtue and justice in a redistributive model of land rents where it is merely an academic point whether the power-holder who does the redistribution is a Party oligarch or a capitalist oligarch.

Beside this speech I most clearly remember the whispered and anxious discussions from delegates from all over Siberia about what should be done with the fact that ‘outsiders’ are now sitting in our ‘autonomous legislatures’. Clearly worried about the new development wherein indigenous deputies are no longer sent to sit as perhaps figureheads or perhaps activists in regional parliaments, the question was raised at what level could the voice of native nationalities be voiced. From the official tribune, the debate, which spoke the loudest, was for the encouragement for some form of municipal governance wherein national villages, national communes (obshchiny), or national ‘farms’ could have a well-demarcated bundle of rights to land and to subsidies. This discussion is telling of the dramatic revision of scale in the demands of indigenous rights activists in Russia today. Voiced appropriately in the corridors of the former congress hall of the Central Executive Committee – the agency which in 1932 created the Autonomous Districts in the first place – there was a battle-weary recognition that civic autonomy on a grand scale was no longer an appropriate goal for communities suffering the degree of impoverishment common throughout Siberia. Instead, civic resources should be ‘addressed’ (adresno) directly into the hands of particular extended families or clan units who would be given long-term leases of land for their subsistence. In these discussions there was a feeling of closure to what I once described as a ‘citizenship regime’ of benefits distributed through discrete markers of identity like nationality (Anderson 1996a). In what seems like a new idiom, rural hunters are now seen to have an interest or identity which is ‘native’ and which is effectively parcelled in particular discrete enterprises such as communes or farms. These municipal-level entities are seen to have a preferred claim on narrow strips of land and upon cash or barter benefits which come from total-social-conglomerates like the mining centre in Noril’sk. It would be safe to conclude that the sparse nationalities of Siberia are no longer seen as one of the (younger) fraternal persons participating in the building of some sort of personified national entity (like Soviet Man). Today there seems to be some consensus both among executively seated oligarchs as among the campaigners for rights that ‘nativeness’ is an internationally recognised status which has its place amongst claimants
of largesse like other active members of social collectives like pensioners or students. It is a claim, which should be treated professionally and cost-effectively, but not respected to the degree that it harms capital accumulation. The vision of encapsulated economic development in the service of some nationality it would seem is yesterday’s dream overshone by the sharp colours of today’s economic realities.

With the election of the new oligarchs, the Soviet model of building collectivities with the right to nationality-stratified social entitlements has been laid to rest. Nevertheless, the political strategy of mixing identity-claims to claims to entitlement is still as strong here as it is in resource colonies in liberal-welfare economies the world over. The keyword used today is no longer national’nost’ but instead different ways that rents or subsidies can be ‘aimed’ (tselenopravleno) or ‘addressed’ (adreno) towards recipients. As outlined above, the more popular proposals are for the creation of certain small-scale socio-economic fragments of the older vision of an autonomous/national area, which would then be the targets of these rents. The idea of discovering or creating addresses, which suggests that rural native peoples are presently homeless – or at least lacking a fixed address – evocatively captures the political situation of the new Siberia. Under oligarchic liberalism, native people have lost the executive and legislative homes that they once had and their de facto homes in subsidised rural settlements seem to be under the threat of cost-cutting rationalisation. Native people here, as elsewhere in the circumpolar north, must now identify a new lever by which to make claims on mineral rents and other social entitlements. The two most common tools – the idea of aboriginal rights and the idea of nature protection – which will be the subject of the next sections, are taken not so much from the vocabulary of state socialism but from movements which have evolved out of dialogues with multi-national corporations world-wide. In identifying the presence of a new form of paternalistic corporate industrialism and a distinctive market-oriented identity argument, it makes sense if we shed the cumbersome language of post-socialism. It now seems more elegant, or at least simpler, to write once again of the ‘development of underdevelopment’ (Frank 1984) or the old idea of Siberia as a colony (Yadrintsev 1892).
Aboriginal Rights as a Hold on the Future

The rapid deployment of the idea of ‘aboriginality’ in Siberia is a remarkable development the significance of which is disguised by the seeming appropriateness of the term. For generations under Soviet power, and even before, rural hunters and herders were able to describe their belonging to the Russian state through a very subtle idea of nationality. Siberian peoples were thought to be diminutive – demographically ‘small’ – nationalities who without special executive attention might disappear. Only very recently, circa 1997, did people gingerly at first start using the term ‘native’ (korennoi) to put a better edge on their demands for entitlement (Anderson in press). In proper usage, the idea of nativeness is combined with the idea of smallness creating a cumbersome phrase ‘native demographically-small peoples of the north’. In practice, more and more people just use the word native as a gloss on this idea, effectively capturing this term for exclusive use by a particular group of people.6

There is much to mourn with the displacement of the term nationality. In comparison with other rights identifiers, this Soviet-era idea did not confine entitlements to a genetically distinct population. In Soviet Siberia, rural hunters and herders did not encounter the problem of how to speak about children of mixed descent. In other parts of the world, most significantly in North America, British idioms of racial purity colour the political landscape such that full blood or full status aboriginal people are often placed in the situation where they have to argue for the disentitlement of their metis neighbours. However, like most identity instruments refined during the Soviet period, the nationality identifier fragmented consumers and citizens into discrete groups each of which had to be treated individually and with some attention. This type of policy is both expensive and subverts the economies of scale, which are the lifeblood of corporate expansion. To ask someone’s nationality, just as to use someone’s patronymic, has become in the new Russia an ‘old fashioned’ and somewhat backwards way approaching business.

The idea of aboriginality, however, captures the attention of the corporate oligarchs for two reasons. The first is due to the historic fact that newly found ‘cousins’ of Siberia’s indigenous peoples in Australia, in Alaska, and in Canada have for at least a half century fought successful battles to protect their lands from the devastation wrought by mineral exploration and more
importantly to receive shares of this development. These battles have become institutionalised both in informal codes of practice and in institutional guidelines such that large multinational companies are now wary of stomping arrogantly over the rights of local people. The second factor seems to be invested in the word itself, which implies a property claim on the basis of prior occupation and use of space. The new oligarchs, like business interests the world over, are most interested in protecting the sanctity of private property in space, in proceeds, and, seemingly, in monopoly access to markets. The aboriginal claim is pitched in the same language by making a claim to radical ownership, which predates the very technologies, which made the oligarch’s interest in nickel or gas valuable.

As evocative as is the aboriginal rights claim, it is paradoxical. From an anthropological view, radical claims to the possession of space vastly oversimplify the type of relationship that hunters and herders have developed with the land. As Tim Ingold (2000, chapter 8) has evocatively identified in his critique of the aboriginality claim, the idea of positing rights and privilege on the basis of having some sort of genetic connection to a space draws attention away from the skills which in most parts of the circumpolar north were the markers that one used to argue for ones access to places. Through the use of aboriginality claims one encounters the paradox that urban-based ‘card-carrying’ aboriginal people can make claim on distant rural spaces when individuals who may speak a native language and live a hunting lifestyle might lack the credentials to make claims on the lives of the animals, forests, and rivers that surround them. From a purely analytical point of view, a rights discourse based in genealogical descent rather than skill misrepresents the real life issues at stake. By trucking in categories foreign to the experience it describes actually it might do damage to those who live the ecological relationships that it represents. Thus it is appropriate to view claims to nativeness as a particularly evocative lever to make claims within a liberal-welfare ideology which sadly lacks some of the subtlety of the nationality claims made a generation earlier.

However it is one thing to cast analytic judgement on a term but quite another to investigate how this idea functions in the ecology of relationships which is oligarchic Siberia. To the credit of aboriginal people in Siberia, they have very quickly sensed the shamanic power that claims to property seem to hold over the new elites and have correctly identified the appropriate
term in Russian which signals an exclusive demand more radical than the licenses that corporations enjoy over resources. In this sense the deployment of the term ‘native’ in Siberia ranks alongside the classic anthropological work of Harvey Feit of how politically-savvy Cree hunters deployed the ideas of ‘[financial] banks’ and ‘gardens’ to express to well-meaning outsiders how they structured their relationships with the land (Feit 2001). The coinage of creole metaphors, as with the playful syncretic experimentation with new ideologies, characterises the relationship between rural hunters and colonial agents as much as the stark contrast between the inchoate but wise hunter and the shortsighted industrialist. Whether we examine the way that the James Bay Cree see hydro-electric engineers as remorseless cannibal monsters (Feit in press), or the rich literature of the role of the Devil and various saints in Latin American post-colonial tradition (Taussig 1980; 1995; Nash 1979; Gow 1993), the syncretic engagement between rural philosophers and single-minded industrial magnates is one of the more refreshing and hopeful developments in political philosophy. Given that the syncretic engagement between Siberian and North American native people and European philosophers such as Rousseau, Locke and Jefferson gave us the very concepts of liberty, property, and of equitable distribution in the first place (Grinde and Johanson 1991; Grant 1999; Brandon 1986) one should expect that the continued experimentation with the ideas of freedom, entitlement, and possession through the idea of being a ‘native’ in Siberia should yield equally evocative results.

What is striking about the new claims to aboriginality in Siberia is not so much that they function as brazen claims to possession and occupation as the term applies (and as it is understood by the oligarchs) as they are arguments about an understanding of history. The discourse of economic and social development is most often not an argument about a tangible and evident present. In Taimyr and Evenkia, for example, the campaign platforms which successfully grabbed a hold upon the electorate focussed upon the promise of future prosperity through somewhat speculative ventures to export gas and oil from Evenkia to China or to open new mines on the territory of Taimyr. The new administrations were given power through the operation of the ‘future-in-the-present’ in a dreaming that I like to describe to students as ‘Development-Time’ (with reference to the Australian aborigine Dreamtime) (Stanner 1979). I would argue that Evenk and Dolgan politicians are no less...
skilled in the shamanic transformation of the perception of the present as a finance capitalist. The argument of aboriginality takes a different tack of forcing a remembrance of the not-so-distant past in order to grasp a different hold on the future. An idea of privileged possession through prior occupation serves to force planners and statesmen to imagine a different future wherein space is not merely a zone containing cubic meters of gas but also a place for the reproduction of future generations of people. Both arguments are intangible, abstract, and future oriented. The dream of aboriginality, aside from being an aesthetically nicer dream, is a more embracing one. It draws attention to itself for its references to international law, Russian constitutional law, and new norms of international organisations such as the World Bank. It also startles corporate agents to attention for its claim to property – an ideology that the oligarchs also defend. In this manner the claim to possession which evokes a future based in the past is one of the more powerful claims which can be made. No doubt it is felt to be more powerful than the older claims to nationality which had purchase in the now defunct Soviet identity economy.

Nature as a Natural Resource

Although traditional legal avenues for respecting and defending local relationships to land are being transformed for better or for worse by the new oligarchs of Siberia, the institution of protected areas in various forms is another relational institution which is enjoying some success in the post-Soviet landscape. As mentioned above, the history of Russian experimentation with protected areas is deep stretching back to the mid 19th Century. It receives a boost during the early Soviet period at the same time that various forms of militaristic autonomous districts were dreamed up by reformers. The philosophy of nature protection in Russia is complex and more nuanced than the history of the nature protection movement in British colonies. Guided by a similar romantic conviction that pristine places need to be guarded from encroachment, the Russian nature protection movement differs for the various debates taken on the instrumental or ‘rational’ use of protected places. Thus in Russia one finds a large spectrum ranging from ‘baseline’ (etalion) strict nature reserves (zapovedniki) where all human activity is restricted to various shades of national parks and reserves where land might be set aside
in order to improve the harvesting of wildlife resources. According to the research of Douglas Weiner (1998; 1999), protected spaces in Russia are special for the major debates they inspired concerned the role of nature in the service of the state. Some modernisers wished to use protected spaces to experiment upon nature by introducing and improving native breeds. Some conservators, of course, wished to shield places from all human interference. However when this legacy of a debate on human use is added to the history of creating spaces for the encapsulated development of northern peoples, one achieves a very rich spectrum of institutional forms wherein the social meaning of land itself becomes the focus of a range of specially tailored social institutions.

Central Siberia hosts some of the most notable experiments in nature protection, including three major ‘strict’ reserves – the Central Siberian, Putoran, and Big Taimyr reserves – as well as a host of other experimental territories for the recovery and harvesting of wildlife. Arguably, the way that collective farms were regrouped in the early 1970s was with a very technocratic but nonetheless interesting vision of how nature might best be harnessed for socialism. Some of the most shocking practices of land use – such as the mowing-down of migratory caribou at water crossings – are in fact ugly industrial innovations of aboriginal technique. Further, Taimyr has been a laboratory for the introduction and acclimatisation of foreign forms of wildlife such as muskrat and muskoxen. The most bizarre recent economy in the region is through a resurrection of an ancient economy in the trade of mammoth bones – modernised today as a search for frozen mammoth flesh, which is to be literally used to resurrect the woolly mammoth from its icy grave. The main point is that in Siberia today, the act of denoting and circumscribing special protected areas does not necessarily withdraw these places from human action but may in fact focus discussion as to how certain types of economic and scientific interests can be embedded into special places.

Again, it is unclear if the land hunger for Yukos-financed oil exploration or Noril’sk-financed mineral prospecting overshadows this old tradition such that it will become but a footnote in the history of the region. However initial reactions are encouraging. Zolotarev’s campaign literature directly embraced an old idea that oil and gas development achieve some sort of manic intensity in some valleys but that the proceeds be used to defend other districts as pristine reserves for the development and protection of traditional Evenki
culture. Similarly Kholoponin’s team in Taimyr, with its characteristic attraction for gaudy Western models, is actively courting (or being courted by) the World Wildlife Fund for Nature, the World Bank’s Global Ecological Facility, to protect species of birds and caribou.

In trying to weigh this new initiative it is once again difficult not to be blinded by aggressive models being proposed by European or American agencies. For example, the WWF for almost a decade has been trying to introduce its model of ‘man-in-the-biosphere’ reserves in Taimyr including the strict protection of nature with a respect for a very traditional interpretation of native lifeways. On the one hand, on paper, these initiatives sound theoretically very similar to the type of rational engagement that the Soviet school of nature protection has been articulating for a century. However, on the other hand, many of the newest and most fashionable visions of ‘people-in-nature’ being marketed by international NGOs can only be understood given their own ecological history of having evolved from models of nature protection where indigenous people were forcibly removed from their lands (the most common examples being the North American parks). As with the enlightened paternalistic capitalism of the new oligarchs, it is tempting to identify once again a coincidental merging of Eastern and Western rites over the worship of nature. It is true that international NGOs offer the best-financed and most enthusiastic support for pushing through models of nature protection at the present juncture. However their technical suggestions stand at odds pre-Soviet and Soviet models of nature protection wherein nature was not seen merely as a picturesque backdrop to urban life but was seen as part of a national strategy for development.

A hopeful sign in this sphere is once again a form of syncretic innovation. One example from Central Siberia illustrates this point. The Taimyr administration proposes to create a Popigai ‘national park’ in the far eastern corner of the district. In this proposal, the term ‘national’ is being used as a pun signalling a connection to Russian state development as well as a place that would be interpolated according to Dolgan-Sakha tradition (the majority ethnic group in the region). With one eye closed the place looks like a traditional nature reserve. Looking at it with the other eye the proposal looks like an Autonomous District inscribed on a smaller scale. Thus in terms of protecting pristine nature, the proposal for the national park speaks of restricting nature resource development (a significant clause given that the territory
overlaps with one of the most promising diamond 'pipes' in the region). However on the side of affirming traditional land use practices the territory not only permits aboriginal hunting and reindeer herding but would in fact encourage them through special infusions of capital for equipment and a programme of ethnographic tourism. The economic development angle through tourism has captured the interest of new Governor who has promised to devote special executive attention to pushing this idea through. In this proposal aboriginal rights blur with nature protection and economic activity. In comparison with older models of entitlement, however, the group which 'holds' these rights is not the Dolgan nationality as a whole but concretely the community of Dolgan hunters and herders living within the community of Popigai.

Conclusion
The main theme of this chapter has been to analyse the major dimensions of aboriginal rights politics in the new Siberia of the resource oligarchs. The chapter has made some strong claims – specifically that older Soviet models of arguing entitlements through specific collective identifiers (such as nationality) has been decisively broken. Here I suggest that with the election of the oligarchs we can identify a political context that is no longer ambiguously 'post-socialist' and 'transitional'. At least in Central Siberia, aboriginal rights discourse, nature protection discourse, and the power games of the new oligarchs suggest very strongly the type of corporatist politics, which now predominates in resource frontiers the world over. In this chapter I have argued that there are some continuities from the Soviet period into the new period of 'power holding'. Both corporate agents and aboriginal rights activists still map identity onto space. However to do so both must use competing notions of time, encouraging people to alternately remember or imagine different futures. Somewhat controversially, I have suggested that there is only a small difference between centralised power in the 'days of stagnation' and the type of ecology of power that new industrial oligarchs would like to construct around themselves. By examining two old institutional forms – the idea of nationally-stratified territorial autonomy and types of nature protection – I have argued that a vague vision of aboriginal rights can be embedded into spaces which are set apart from blind industrial exploitation.
This type of nationally inflected territory can be viewed as an interesting form of property – one that is fragile but nonetheless suggestive of a unique form of accommodation between state and capital in Siberia.

Notes

1. This paper is based upon recent field research in the Taimyr and Evenki Autonomous Districts as well as in Yeniseisk and Turukhansk counties of Krasnoiarsk Territory. The work builds upon my initial doctoral apprenticeship in Taimyr in 1993. The goal of my recent work was to assist a group of Canadian aboriginal rights lawyers in ‘transferring’ ideas of aboriginal entitlement to representatives of local aboriginal rights associations and to regional Siberian government administrators. This fieldwork was organised by Canada-Russia Parliamentary Programme (Ottawa and Moscow) and funded by the Canadian International Development Agency. Meetings in Krasnoiarsk, Yeniseisk, Turukhansk, Igarka, Dudinka, Tura, and Khatanga occurred over seven weeks during several trips between March 2000 and July 2001. Most of the ideas for this paper came out during interviews or round-table discussions in these cities.

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2. In an exception proving the rule, Semen Yakovlevich Palchin, a well-known Soviet-era Nenets politician was elected to the Taimyr Duma in a bi-election in April 2001. During his campaign he enjoyed the tacit support of the Khloponin team.

3. The significance of this change can not be overemphasised. In the Soviet period, most rural policy for native people in the Autonomous District was funnelled through rural economic development. State farms were the entities which paid wages, supported hunters and reindeer herders, and provided electricity and heat to villagers. By dissolving this Ministry within a superministry of Infrastructure, the new administration has quite is significantly ignoring the issue of directed rural development.

4. In the spring of 2001, the Noril’sk Industrial District was merged with the city councils of Noril’sk, Talnakh, Kaerkan, and Snezhnogorsk to form a single, sprawling municipality. This is the latest permutation in a complex shell game over the structural control of the development one of Russia’s most wealthy urban spaces. In past incarnations Noril’sk was a industrial unit/prison camp run by the
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NKVD, a extraterritorial unit of Moscow and then Krasnoiarsk, and in the not-so-distant past a major trading post and Christian chapel for Dolgan and Evenki aboriginal peoples (cf Anderson 2000, 17 n.).

5 There is some printed evidence for the new sensitivity of the oligarchic business community to aboriginal claims in recent newspaper statements. According to the electronic business journal Russian Observer, a newly formed Committee on External and Defence Politics, made up of representatives from business, is worried about three aspects of Siberian development: Chinese immigration, urban development, and ‘the serious claims that sparse native peoples are making upon companies’ (Pletnev 2001). The Moskovskie Novosti reports that Putin takes ideas for the strategic development of Siberia from a think-tank called ‘Siberia’ made up of representatives of Noril’sk Nickel, Siberian Aluminum, and the Alliance Group ‘among others’ (Fedorov 2001).

6 It is important to note that in Siberia the preferred term is ‘native’ and not ‘aboriginal’. The word aborigen technically implies Australian aboriginal peoples and carries an unpleasant connotation of primitiveness. The word korennoi – derived from the word for root – has not traditionally been reserved to describe aboriginal peoples (like the English equivalent it can be used to describe any person, or for that matter plant or animal, which grew up in a particular place). In English it has become more proper to use the word aboriginal when talking about the rights of rural indigenous hunters.

7 It is interesting note that in Evenki at least it is not possible to communicate the idea of ‘nativeness’ with a single word, but only through the use of suffixes which denote belonging to concrete places.

References


